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Virginia Woolf's
Double Discourse

PAMELA L. CAUGHIE
;;.

If human beings were not divided into two biological sexes, there
would probably be no need for literature. And if literature could truly
say what the relations between the sexes are, we would doubtless not
need much of it then either.
BARBARA JOHNSON

The Critical Difference (13)

Written by a feminist (Virginia Woolf), for a bisexual (Vita Sackville-West),
about an androgyne (Orlando), the novel Orlando would seem to be the
quintessential feminist text. And that, indeed, is what it is in danger of
becoming, just as Woolf is in danger of becoming the acclaimed Mother
of Us All. In promoting Virginia Woolf's Orlando as a feminist work,
feminist critics have picked the right text, but for the wrong reasons.!
Orlando works as a feminist text not because of what it says about sexual
identity but because of what it manages not to say; not because of what
it reveals about the relation between the sexes but because of what it does
to that relation; not because its protagonist is androgynous but because
its discourse is duplicitous. With its eponymous character who changes
from a man to a woman halfway through the novel, with its capricious
narrator who at times speaks in the character of Orlando's male biographer
and at others sounds suspiciously like Orlando's female author, this novel
assumes what Jane Gallop calls a "double discourse." This double discourse is one that is oscillating and open, one that "asserts and then
questions," "a text that alternately quotes and comments, exercises and
critiques."2 By drawing on the Lacanian readings of Jane Gallop and Shoshana Felman, I want to offer a reading of Orlando that will explore its
functioning as a feminist text and that will expose many feminist critics'
appropriation of it.
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Orlando is a biographical novel about a poet who lives and loves for
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over three centuries (and who is likely to live and love three more), changing from a man to a woman halfway through the novel, somewhere around
the end of the seventeenth century. When discussing this novel, one must
begin with this caution: anything you can say about Orlando can be used
against you. For Orlando defies conclusions. The text of Orlando is as
unstable as the sex of Orlando. The first words of the novel shake our
certainty about anything in this text. We read, "He-for there could be
no doubt of his sex ... ," and immediately our doubt is aroused. The
emphasis on what should be obvious makes it seem unnatural. The emphasis on an innocent pronoun makes it suspect. This novel abounds in
qualifications ("Change was incessant, and change perhaps would never
cease"), paradoxes ("the [bllink] space is filled to repletion"), and contradictions (the androgyne itself). This sexual and textual indeterminacy links
language and identity. As the androgynous Orlando brings the question
of sexual identity to the fore, the obtrusive narrator brings the textual
language to the fore by intruding to discuss his own art (e.g., 65), to mock
his own method (e.g., 266), and to characterize his own readers (73).
Orlando is identified with writing throughout: she is read like a book (25);
she concludes that she is "only in the process of fabrication" (175); and
she writes at her poem through four centuries, borrowing indiscriminately
from different literary ages, all the while questioning "What's an 'age,'
indeed?" (205).
This novel, then, is a text about writing, about constructing lives, histories, identities, and fictions. Its desire is for expression itself, as Orlando
says, for the fulfillment of desire "in whatever form it comes, and may
there be more forms, and stranger" (294). This fulfillment of desire, this
desire for expression, encourages us to read androgyny not in terms of
some innate bisexuality but in terms of the situation of desire, the subject's
situation in a signifying chain. One must assume a sexual identity in order
to take one's place in language, in order to express anything. Sexual identity
is assumed in language; it is, as Felman says, "conditioned by the functioning of language."3 Woolf brings out the arbitrariness of that identity,
the arbitrariness of language itself, through Orlando's switching from one
sex to the other, and from one poetic language to another, as well as
through the shifting of her own rhetoric in this novel.
Just as Orlando's identity swings from the extreme of conventionalityOrlando as a boy slicing at the swinging Moor's head-to the extreme of
eccentricity-Orlando as a woman discovering she has three sons by another woman-so the language of the text shifts from the transparent
conventionality of cliches-to put it in a nutshell, by the skin of his teeth-

to the opaque originality of Orlando and her lover Shel's cypher languageRattigan Glumphoboo. Just as the bombastic masque of the Three Sisters
hyperbolizes Orlando's sex change, the self-conscious diction maximizes
the language of the text, not just the self-conscious diction of Orlando's
extravagant metaphors (he calls his lover a melon, a pineapple, an olive
tree, a fox in the snow), but the self-conscious diction of the biographer's
narrative as well (he describes Orlando's betrothed as fair, florid, and
phlegmatic). Just as the sexual differences are put into confusion ("You're
a woman, Shel!" "You're a man, Orlando!"), so are the extremes of rhetoric. For as Woolf reveals by mocking her own "Time Passes" section of
To the Lighthouse, what is highly original in one context can, in another,
be a tedious, grandiloquent way of saying simply "time passed" (Orlando
97-98). What is conventional and wb.at is original, what is mainstream
and what is marginal change, like Orlando's sex, with time and circumstance. We see that identity is as variable as language, language as vulnerable as identity. Woolf's rhetoric in Orlando is no more chaste than
is her protagonist.
What this novel expresses, then, is the difficulty of reaching conclusions
about identity or language. Both are based on making distinctions, yet
these distinctions are not fixed by reference to anything outside them.
There is nothing "out there" to measure them against. What Woolf shares
with a writer like Lacan is his verbal play meant to undercut his own
position as the one presumed to know. 4 What Woolf admires in and shares
with writers like Browne, De Quincey, and Montaigne is their willingness
to entertain a variety of opinions, their contentment to remain in uncertainties, and their use of qualifying language to avoid "the rash assumptions
of human ignorance" ("Montaigne," The Common Reader 64). And so,
in Orlando, "we are now in the region of 'perhaps' and 'appears' " (102).
To speak directly and with certainty on any matter is beyond the novelist
Woolf as it is beyond the poet Orlando. Desperately seeking the irreducible
linguistic episteme, Orlando discovers that one cannot simply say what
one means and leave it: "So then he tried saying the grass is green and
the sky is blue and so to propitiate the austere spirit of poetry.... 'The
sky is blue,' he said, 'the grass is green.' Looking up, he saw that on the
contrary, the sky is like the veils which a thousand Madonnas have let
fall from their hair; and the grass fleets and darkens like a flight of girls
fleeing the embraces of hairy satyrs from enchanted woods. 'Upon my
word,' he said, ... 'I don't see that one's more true than another. Both
are utterly false' " (101-2).
As Orlando discovers, poetry and nature, language and identity, must
be learned together. 5 This is the point of the vacillating rhetoric and the
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epicene protagonist of Woolf's novel. Orlando's identity, like her poem,
is a palimpsest. It is "compounded of many humours," composed of "odds
and ends," a "meeting-place of dissemblables" (73, 176). Orlando continually wavers between beliefs, changes or disguises her sex, moves in harmony with and at odds with the times. So too Woolf's novel offers support
for differing positions without arguing for anyone. She writes: "Society
is the most powerful concoction in the world and society has no existence
whatsoever" (194); there is not much difference between the sexes, for
Orlando remains "fundamentally the same" throughout, and the difference
is "one of great profundity" (138, 188); "Clothes are but a symbol of
something hid deep beneath," and clothes "wear us," changing "our view
of the world and the world's yiew of us" (187-88). Such oscillations on
the thematic and narrative levels of this novel are presented metaphorically
in the recurring image of the perpetually swaying arras and in the alternation of light and dark in Orlando's cab ride with Alexander Pope. It is
in the midst of all these contrarieties, in the midst of such violent shifts
in viewpoint, that Woolf offers her famous androgynous statement, not
as a metaphysical or feminist theory, not as a resolution to or a synthesis
of contrarieties, but as a way to remain suspended between opposed beliefs: "For here again we come to a dilemma. Different though the sexes
are, they intermix. In every human being a vacillation from one sex to
the other takes place, and often it is only the clothes that keep the male
or female likeness, while underneath the sex is the very opposite of what
it is above" (189). Androgyny embodies this oscillation between positions.
It figures a basic ambiguity, not only a sexual ambiguity but a textual one
as well. Androgyny is a refusal to choose. 6
And yet so many critics choose androgyny as the appropriate textual
strategy or the appropriate sexual identity. In praising Woolf's Orlando
for its presentation of transsexual ism and its theory of androgyny, most
critics have tended to take Woolf's statements out of their context in this
novel and to cite them as unambiguous truths about sexual identity or
modernist-feminist novels. The androgynous Orlando is appropriated as
a symbol of the more unified self, or as a resolution to the problem of
true self and conventional self. "Androgynous wholeness" is the phrase
Sandra Gilbert uses (119,127). Androgyny becomes a form of self-mastery,
a metaphor for the autonomous self, a freedom from history, society,
language. Yet such readings fail to grasp the concept of identity in Orlando
because they fail to attend to its rhetoric.
In Orlando, androgyny and transsexualism call into question not just
conventional assumptions about sexuality, but, more important, conventional assumptions about language itself. In its rhetorical transports, Woolf's
44
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novel challenges the reference theory of meaning. In particular, it que:tions
the notion that words get their meanings from things they refer to; the
definition of words and categories by their essential traits; and the isolation
of words and statements from their contexts of use in order to interpret
them. The point of focusing on the marginal case (e.g., the transsexual)
is to reveal the crucial decisions made in the application of a term or in
the assumption of an identity. We can see this point most clearly in the
famous clothes philosophy passage in Chapter Four, the passage often
cited as Woolf's theory of androgyny.
Now a woman and living in the eighteenth century, Orlando in this
chapter is becoming acutely aware of her sex as she faces a legal challenge
to her property rights, as she parries the advances of the ship's captain
and the Archduke, and as she contends..with "the coil of skirts about her
legs" (153). Initially unchanged by the sex change, or so her biographer
tells us, Orlando is now assuming a more feminine nature. Her biographer
writes: "The change of clothes had, some philosophers will say, much to
do with it. Vain trifles as they seem, ... they change our view of the world
and the world's view of us" (187). According to this philosophy, our
identity is as changeable as our apparel. Clothes make the man, or the
woman. The difference between men, and between men and women,
would seem to be a superficial one. However, the biographer continues:
"That is the view of some philosophers and wise ones, but on the whole,
we incline to another. The difference between the sexes is, happily, one
of great profundity. Clothes are but the symbol of something hid deep
beneath. It was a change in Orlando herself that dictated her choice of a
woman's dress and a woman's sex" (188). That is, clothes don't make the
woman, clothes mark the woman beneath. But again, the biographer continues, and two sentences later we find the famous androgyny passage
cited above: "For here again, we come to a dilemma. Different though
the sexes are, they intermix. In every human being a vacillation from one
sex to the other takes place, and often it is only the clothes that keep the
male or female likeness, while underneath the sex is the very opposite of
what it is above," (189).
Placed in its context, this paragraph not only contradicts the earlier
assertion that Orlando's sex change had not affected his/her identity, and
that other philosophy that says we put on our identity with our clothing,
but it also contradicts itself. For the biographer begins by saying that
clothes are a symbol of something deep beneath, that is, one's nature or
identity, and ends by remarking that often what is deep beneath is the
opposite of the clothing above. In other words, the passage asserts both
that clothes are natural and fitting and that clothes are arbitrary and de45
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ceiving. Such a self-contradiction is not in the least surprising in this particular novel. What is surprising is that in appropriating this statement as
Woolf's theory of androgyny, critics pass over the contradictions, accepting the statement at face value, taking the biographer at his word,
which is to take his discourse for granted.
If we consider this passage within its eighteenth-century context, we
see that W 001£ is not arguing for one of two ontological theories-that
is that identity is fixed or it is changeable, that sexual differences are
n~tural or they are learned-but presenting two positions in eighteenthcentury thought which come out of a particular conception of language.
On the one hand, we have Samuel Johnson's position: thought must be
distinguished from rhetoric, the content from the form, the man from his
attire. On the other hand, we nave Alexander Pope's position: the rhetoric
makes the thought, the form and content are inseparable, the man must
dress to advantage. On the one hand, clothes are vain trifles and rhetoric
is superfluous; on the other hand, clothes are expressive and rhetoric is
essential.
But these apparently opposing views are grounded ~n the .same assu~p
tions about language and identity. To speak of rhetorIc as either reveahng
or concealing, to speak of appearance as either natural or contrived, is to
set up a false opposition. It is to assume that we can get .beyond or ben~ath
the linguistic paradigm, in which rhetori~al an.d s~xual d1fference.s ~~nctlOn.
Such assumptions about language and 1dentity 1mply the poss1b1hty of a
natural or naked state or status. Thus, when Sandra Gilbert offers us the
choice of stripping away "costumes (and selves) to reveal the pure, sexless
(or third-sexed) being behind gender and myth" (214-15), she a~sumes. a
pure, free ontological essence which we can locate and define prIor t? 1tS
insertion into language, society, culture. Proving the contrary 1S prec1sely
the point of the vacillating rhetoric and epicene protagonist of Woolf's
novel.
In Orlando, clothing, identity, and rhetoric are not an ornamentation
of something prior, but an orientation to something else. What matters
is not what they mask or mark, but what they enable the protagonist or
the writer to accomplish. That is, what matters is not the nature of the
sign, the transsexual, but its position and function within a. particular
discursive situation. And so, we must attend to the productlOn of the
androgynous Orlando, not to her properties. 7 If we return to tha~ clot~es
philosophy passage, we see that in trying to distinguish the ways m wh1.ch
Orlando has changed with the sex change and how Orlando embod1es
traits of both sexes, the biographer ends up making stereotypical remarks,
for he can make such sexual distinctions only by relying on conventional

assumptions about sexual difference. His only recourse, then, is to look
at the particular case: "but here we leave the general question [of sexual
difference] and note only the odd effect it had on the particular case of
Orlando herself" (189). We, too, must attend to the particular case rather
than the general category. What we need in order to read this novel is a
conceptual model that enables us to discuss the androgyne not in terms
of its relation to the self beneath or the world beyond, but in terms of
the multiple and shifting relations among signifying systems, such as rhetoric, fashion, gender, and genre.
Thus, we must attend not only to the various relations among changing
historical periods and rhetorical styles, but also to the changing sexual
metaphors as well. By employing three metaphors for sexual identity in
Orlando-androgyny, transvestism, and. transsexualism-Woolf shows us
that there are different ways of talking about identity, different kinds of
appropriateness, different functions of language. When we fail to specify
the kinds of distinctions we are relying on (as Sandra Gilbert does in
equating these metaphors), our conclusions become suspect. Woolf knows
all too well that any language she can use is already embroiled in certain
conventional assumptions about gender and identity. Her solution, changing metaphors for sexual identity, is less a freedom from a gendered reality
than a freedom from referential thinking. Such freedom comes about by
a change in our conception of language. What is at issue here is a language
that sets up opposing alternatives and one that plays out various relations.
Such an epicene novel is possible when different functions of language are
tested out rather than one being taken for granted.
The androgyne, as Felman says, is "constituted in ambiguity" and therefore is not representative of any "single signified" (32). The androgyne
threatens meaning by breaking down those oppositions that allow us to
make meaningful distinctions. It calls attention to and calls into question
one way of making meaning, the institution of representation. Androgyny
is not a freedom from the tyranny of sex, as Maria DiBattista says, so
much as a freedom from the tyranny of reference. The shifting and blurring
of sexual identities, like the shifting and blurring of literary genres, periods,
and styles, disrupts meaning brought about by fixed polarities, by defined
standards, by rigid categories, by "rhetorical hierarchy" (Felman's phrase).
Sex and text are rhetorical terms; they function not only according to
certain grammatical and syntactical patternings and social norms but also
rhetorically and historically. They are constructed according to a particular
model of language. To put sexual identity and textual meaning into confusion, as Woolf does in Orlando, is to disclose the dependence of sexual
traits and literary standards on certain kinds of discourse. Because one
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cannot locate innate sexual traits or essential literary values in the face of
changing attitudes, conventions, and paradigms (whether scientific, literary,
or psychological), one must continually posit and undermine, affirm and
doubt, "yield and resist" (155). Oscillation is the rhythm of Orlando;
oscillating exploration is its method.
Far from defeating sexual difference, as many feminist critics claim,
Orlando enacts it, enshrines it, exploits it, makes a spectacle of it, but as
a playful oscillation not a stable opposition. The androgynous self in
Orlando is a metaphor for the dramatic, the role-playing self. Androgyny
is a metaphor for change, for openness, for a self-conscious acting out of
intentions. It is not an ideal type, but a contextual response. Identity is
always disguised in Orlando n<;>t because the "true self" is running around
"incognito or incognita as the case might turn out to be" (168) but because
identity is a series of roles. And successive roles subvert referential poles
(Felman 31). In this sense, Orlando presents a Lacanian view of identity.
Woolf no more than Lacan tries to define female identity, for any identity
assumed finally, definitively, essentially will be constraining; any identity
deemed authentic, appropriate, natural will be illusory. Yet Orlando does
not transcend identity any more than Woolf advocates a gender-free reality, as Sandra Gilbert asserts. For one cannot deny the reality of gender
or the necessity of identity. "Identity," Gallop writes, "must be continually
assumed and immediately called into question" (xii), just as expression
must be exercised and at once critiqued. Divesting Orlando of property
and patronym, putting her paternity and propriety into question, Woolf
does not liberate her identity but refuses the categories by which it is
fixed, determined, legalized. Orlando "compromises the coherence" of
sexuality and textuality (see Felman 31). Its open-endedness, its openness
to other literary texts, resists closure and containment, refuses to provide
a conclusive and thus an exclusive statement. 8 Orlando shows us how
sexuality and textuality perform in the world; it does not tell us what they
are or what they should be. What Woolf defies in this novel is any attempt
to define writing or identity by definitive standards to which it conforms
or from which it deviates.
In her diary Woolf refers to Orlando as her "play side."9 It refuses to
stop the play of speculation with a consistent argument or theory. The
play side is concerned with writing as pleasure, not as production. As
Woolf wrote in her typescript of "Professions for Women": "When people
said to me what is the use of your trying to write? I could say truthfully,
I write not for use, but for pleasure" (Pargiters 7). When Orlando admires
the anonymous writers who built the house of literature, she means those
writers who wrote with no practical purpose in mind, whether to protest
48

VIRGINIA WOOLF'S DOUBLE DISCOURSE

or to proselytize, but only out of the love of writing. For too long we
have downplayed the play side of Virginia Woolf as displayed in such
works as Orlando, A Room of One's Own, and Flush. We have turned
her play side into a meaningful representation, into an alternative or an
appropriate form. But as Ionesco once cautioned, any established form
of expression can become a form of oppression, can become authoritative,
can become, in Gallop's words, "a position and a possession." Orlando
and Woolf neither reject past aesthetic standards nor prescribe new ones.
They take from the literary past what is useful to them, use up standards,
dispose of them, and thus expose them as provisional and changeable,
disclose their dependence on certain contexts. Enacting a type of discourse
rather than codifying one, as Woolf does in Orlando, exposes the supposed
universality of aesthetic standards of v'llue. By questioning various metaphysical positions, by testing out various narrative strategies, Woolf produces not "stable assumptions" but "contextual associations" (Gallop 64).
She disrupts our tendency to see language as the transparent medium of
communication; she defies our habit of looking through discourse to representation. It is not that Orlando's playful surface has no point to it; its
point is its playful surface. It is time this play side of Woolf's writing be
accounted for in terms of different conceptions of self, language, and
reality-in terms of a dramatic self not an appropriate one, in terms of a
performative view of language not a cognitive one, in terms of a rhetorical
reality not a referential one.
It is not, then, that the appropriate identity is androgynous, but that
the androgyne defies an appropriate, a definable, identity. Androgyny in
Orlando is not so much a psychosexual category as a rhetorical strategy,
less a condition than a motive. Androgyny does not substitute for anything;
for that would be to fix it, possess it, universalize it. The androgyne defeats
the norm, the universal, the stereotype that Woolf feared becoming, as
she so often expresses in her diaries: "I will go on adventuring, changing,
opening my mind and my eyes, refusing to be stamped and stereotyped"
(A Writer's Diary 206). The stereotype, says Roland Barthes, is "the word
repeated without any magic, any enthusiasm, as though it were natural,
as though by some miracle this recurring word were adequate on each
occasion for different reasons" (The Pleasure of the Text 42) or, I might
add, on different occasions for the same reason. To continue with Barthes's
terminology, the androgyne, unlike the stereotype or the norm, is neither
consistent nor insistent; it is perverse.
By taking the androgynous personality out of its context in this novel,
by turning it into an alternative to or a substitute for the conventional
character of the traditional novel or for the conventional self of patriarchal
49
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society, so many feminist critics run the risk of reducing it to a platitude. 1o
They risk turning a text that works to undo norms, stereotypes, and standards into a new norm, what Gallop calls a "normalizing moralism" or
"a comforting representation." The problem with the platitude, the norm,
the stereotype is not that they are false or trite in themselves but tha~ they
are false or trite in being detached from the contexts that gave nse to
them. As Woolf shows in Orlando, what enables Alexander Pope's scathing remark on the character of women (a remark so fa~ous that the
narrator need not repeat it) to survive to shape future attitudes toward
women is its being loosed from its generating context, which was this:
Orlando inadvertently offended Mr. Pope by dropping a sugar cube "with
a great plop" into his tea (214). A witty remark may be a. petty reto~.
Unmoored from their contexts, literary standards, sexual traits, and SOCial
values appear to be incontestable; yet they are responses to particular
historical and rhetorical situations. Taking Woolf's statement about androgyny out of its context in Orlando, repeating it as an una~biguous
truth about human nature, trivializes it. What gives the concept ItS force
are the contextual, textual, and sexual relationships in which it plays its
part. "If you cannot give something up for something of like value," ~allop
writes, "if you consider it non substitutable, then you don't possess It any
more than it possesses you" (76). We need to look at what Woolf does
in a particular text and context, not at what her writing represents for all
times or for all women.
Like Orlando herself, her critics must avoid the tyranny or folly of sex
pride (160).11 They must avoid setting up a feminist referential in place
of a masculinist one. They must resist reestablishing a natural, even necessary, relation between self and narrative when they have exposed such
a relation as arbitrary and provisional in conventional novels.
What Orlando presents, then, is not a metaphysical theory but a play
of forms. Woolf's androgynous vision affirms Gallop's "permanent alternation " a persistent oscillation, as our binocular vision allows us to see
both duck and rabbit in Wittgenstein's sample sketch (Philosophical Investigations, II, section xi). The double discourse of Orlando enables
Woolf to set up exchanges between opposing positions, between different
orders of discourse. 12 What appears to be an opposition between positions
is tolerated as difference without belligerence, as different options on a
spectrum of possibilities, not a choice of position but ~ doubli~~ of vision.
The double discourse enables Woolf to present a bistable VlSlOn, not a
univocal theory. This double discourse does not deny a feminist reading.
As Gallop says, "This problem of dealing with difference without constituting an opposition may just be what feminism is all about" (93). Woolf's
50
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gesture in Orlando is much like Gallop's in The Daughter's Sedudion:
she undercuts her own writing, or as Woolf puts it, mocks her own lyric
vein (Writer's Diary 104); she changes her viewpoint; she alters her narrative voice. The ironic, mocking tone, the vacillating narrative voice, and
the pastiche of literary allusions in Orlando check our efforts to read for
a personal argument, check our tendency to take Woolf at her word,
which is to take her discourse for granted. The double discourse, in Felman's terms its "play of undecidability," encourages us to suspend our
analytical, judicial, end-seeking, purposive reading for the delight in speculation, equivocation, rhetoric, and play. Feminist readings of Orlando
read only the law, or the counterlaw, of this novel, not its desire.13 They
stress the purposive and polemical over the playful and pleasurable. They
would suppress the very multiplicity aljd flexibility by means of which
Woolf defies authority, systems that shut out (Writer's Diary 183), and
"the desire to make others believe as [she] believes" (149). Orlando is
feminist not in what its language says but in what its discourse achieves.
Orlando gives us not a theory of androgyny but a performance.
If androgyny were a triumph over the tyranny of sex (Maria DiBattista),
a resolution to the contradictions between female and male (Rachel
DuPlessis), or a transcendence of a gendered reality (Sandra Gilbert), then
in writing Orlando Woolf would more than likely have defeated the need
for literature, for sex cannot be separated from text, the grammatical from
the gendered. Orlando's androgyny and diuturnity are not a testament to
some essential and enduring human nature but an affirmation of adaptation
and change and of the life-sustaining impulse to create fictions. The novel
ends at the present moment, the moment of Woolf's writing ("Thursday,
the eleventh of October, Nineteen Hundred and Twenty-eight"), with
Orlando's sighting of the wild goose: "It is the goose!" Orlando cried.
"The wild goose ... " The wild goose and the ellipsis assure us that nothing
is concluded, that the chase will continue. We can only respond, "Encore!"

Notes
1. Some feminist critics I'm referring to are Rachel Blau DuPlessis, Writing beyond

the Ending: Narrative Strategies of Twentieth-Century Women Writers; Sandra
M. Gilbert, "Costumes of the Mind: Transvestism as Metaphor in Modem
Literature"; and Maria DiBattista, Virginia Woolfs Major Novels: The Fables
of Anon. But the reading of Orlando and of androgyny that I take issue with
throughout is a common one in Woolf and feminist criticism.
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2. Jane Gallop, The Daughter's Seduction: Feminism and Psychoanalysis, 122,
126. All references to Orlando are to the Harcourt Brace Jovanovich paperback
edition.
3. Shoshana Felman, "Rereading Femininity." I wrote this essay before reading
Mary Jacobus's Reading Woman. In her introduction, Jacobus presents a reading of Orlando that is similar to my own, drawing as I do on Felman's essay.
4. See Jacqueline Rose's introduction to Lacan's Feminine Sexuality, 50.
5. Thomas Kuhn writes that "nature and words are learned together" in The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 191. In Chapter Two of Orlando, the narrator remarks that the change in language and prose style in the seventeenth
century is accompanied by a change in external conditions, such as in the
natural landscape, in the character traits, and in the sewage system of London
(113).
6. To say androgyny is a refusal to choose is not to deny the possibility of choice.
7. See Jacobus's first chapter, which contains a similar discussion of this novel in
terms of language and clothing. See also Felman's "Rereading Femininity" in
which she discusses sexual identity as "conditioned by the functioning of language" (29).
8. The narrator of Orlando often leads us to a big conclusion, and then omits
it: "and so at last she reached her final conclusion, which was of the highest
importance but which, as we have already much overpassed our limit of six
lines, we must omit" (291). Other examples of this device can be found on
pages 253 and 271.
9. Woolf, A Writer's Diary, 134. In this entry (November 7,1928), Woolf comments on one effect of this play side: "I rather think the upshot will be books
that relieve other books; a variety of styles and subjects: for after all, that is
my temperament, I think, to be very little persuaded of the truth of anything
"
10. This is a characteristic tendency not only of feminist readings of Orlando but
of feminist readings of the androgyne in women's literature in general. See,
for example, DuPlessis's Writing beyond the Ending.
11. In "Women Novelists," Woolf writes: "any emphasis, either of pride or of
shame, laid consciously upon the sex of a writer is not only irritating but
superfluous.... a woman's writing is always feminine; it cannot help being
feminine: the only difficulty lies in defining what we mean by feminine" (Women
and Writing 70). Woolf's feminism, like Lacan's psychoanalysis, does not produce definitions but tries to account for how definitions are produced. See
Rose's introduction to Feminine Sexuality, 57, and Jacobus's Reading Woman,
20-21.
12. The double discourse, like our binocular vision, gives us not just additional
information but a different kind of information, a different way of organizing
or processing what we experience. The shortsightedness of many feminist appropriations of Orlando comes from incorporating its double discourse into
a monostable vision, into the one-to-one correspondence model of the reference theory of meaning. Rather than representing a new concept of self and

narrative, Orlando presents a different way of conceiving of the variou~ relationships both within and between self and narrative. It does not represent a
type; it enacts relations. (For a discussion of the binocular vision, see Gregory
Bateson's Mind and Nature.)
13. It is the Law that gives meaning to sexual difference. Orlando, though, is not
answering the question of the meaning of sexuality; it is exploring, as Felman
puts it, the complex relations between sexuality and meaning. See Shoshana
Felman, Writing and Madness, 156.
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